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TRUE LOVE IS REQUITED: THE ARGUMENT OF LYSIS 221D-222A 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Any argument is open to objection.  These objections 
sometimes lead us to view an argument as fallacious, even 
laughably so.  It is not unusual for interpreters to find 
laughably fallacious arguments in Socratic dialogues.  A 
case in point is the Lysis.  This is not the place to 
defend every argument in that dialogue:  I limit myself 
here to defending only its argument that true love is 
requited.1  In what follows I state the argument, the main 
objections, and my replies.  I begin with a synopsis of the 
dialogue. 
1. SYNOPSIS OF DIALOGUE 
Plato sets the Lysis in the context of Athenian 
pedophilia.2 Socrates narrates how he meets Hippothales, 
Ctesippus, and other young men who are probably past their 
adolescence and evidently old enough to be pedophiles 
(203a).  The young men invite Socrates to see their 
wrestling club, where there are beautiful boys, boys who are 
perhaps at the beginning of adolescence and evidently young 
enough to be objects of the pedophilia of the young men, 
including Hippothales’ favorite, the beautiful Lysis, and 
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Lysis’s best friend Menexenus (204a-d, 206d).  The youth 
Hippothales in his infatuation has been writing foolish 
lyrics about his beloved boy (204d-205d). Socrates offers 
to show the proper way for a lover to converse with his 
beloved (206c).  So it is arranged:  Socrates enters the 
club and starts a conversation with the boys Menexenus and 
Lysis, while Hippothales listens in the background.   
First, with Lysis, Socrates establishes that wisdom is 
the cause of friendship and belonging:  “If ever you come 
to be wise, boy, everyone will be friendly to you and 
everyone will belong to you” 3 (210d1-2). The conditional in 
this context indicates causation, as the context makes 
clear:  Socrates uses the word “cause” earlier in 
discussing an example illustrating this principle (209b8). 
Second, with Menexenus and Lysis, Socrates looks for 
an answer to the question “how someone becomes a friend of 
another” (212a5-6).  A number of accounts of friendship are 
shown to fail.  Friendship cannot be explained in terms of 
like attracted to like (214c) nor opposite attracted to 
opposite (216a). With the conversation in perplexity, 
Socrates postulates that it is the beautiful that is loved 
in friendship (216c), and “like a mantic” divines that 
“what is neither good nor bad loves what is beautiful i.e. 
good” (216d). Socrates suggests a cause for the friendship 
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that the intermediate has for the good: the presence of 
bad. For example, people (an intermediate) become friends 
to medical doctors (a good) because of the presence of 
illness (a bad, 216e-217b). But he rules out badness as the 
cause of friendship on the grounds that (i) some desires 
and hence friendship would exist even if all badness were 
destroyed and (ii) desire is sufficient for one to be a 
friend (221b-c).  This leads him, in the argument I examine 
here, to postulate that desire is the cause of friendship, 
while the lack of what belongs is the cause of desire, with 
the consequence that true love is requited.   
In linking friendship with belonging, this argument 
with Lysis and Menexenus is reminiscent of the earlier 
argument reached with Lysis alone.4  It is also dramatically 
linked.  Socrates narrates the reaction of Hippothales to 
his display of the proper way to speak to one’s beloved 
only twice, at these two conclusions.  At the first 
conclusion, that wisdom is the cause of friendship and 
belonging, Socrates observes that Hippothales is “in a 
state of conflict and distress by the argument” (210e5-6).  
At the second conclusion, that true love is requited, 
Socrates observes that “Hippothales beamed every color of 
the rainbow in his delight” (222b2).  Evidently having now 
completed his promised display on the proper way to address 
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one’s lover, Socrates then “reviews the argument” (222b3) 
by putting three pairs of alternatives to the boys, and 
they fall into perplexity. Socrates wants at this point to 
“move one of the older people” (223a1-2) to join the 
inquiry, but the boys are called away by their pedagogues 
and the dialogue ends. 
 2. CAUSAL RATHER THAN CONDITIONAL PREMISES 
 In Socrates’ argument that true love is requited we 
find natural language use of: 
 
• Causation, as in “desire is the cause of friendship” 
(221d3). 
• The verb of being, as in “that which desires is a 
friend” (221d3-4). 
• The direct object of a verb cognate with the subject, 
as in “the thing desiring desires this: whatever it 
lacks” (221d7-e1). 
• The verb of becoming and an objective genitive, as in 
“Something becomes lacking of whatever it is deprived” 
(221e2-3). 
• The verb of turning-out-to-be and an objective 
genitive, as in “love, friendship, and desire turn out 




This is a fine-grained and suggestive language.  For my 
purposes, I treat it as a series of explanatory causes from 
desire to belonging:  friendship is caused by desire; 
desire by lack; lack by deprivation; and deprivation by 
belonging (premises 1-5 below).  My treatment overlooks 
some finer points of the argument, but allows me to display 
its soundness. 
 Despite the absence of conditionals from premises 1-5 
of the argument, some interpreters represent the argument 
in terms of conditional premises (e.g. Bordt 1998: 221-223, 
Bordt 2000: 169, Rowe 2000: 212).  Such representation is 
unsatisfactory.  For each cause is meant to provide 
necessary as well as sufficient conditions (sufficient, at 
least, relative to appropriate background conditions):  
immediately before this argument began, it was agreed that 
a cause is necessary for its effect: “when a cause is 
abolished, that of which it was the cause cannot exist,” 
221c3-5). 
 Biconditionality is also inadequate as a 
representation of premises 1-5.5  Causation is distinct from 
biconditionality: the biconditional is symmetric, but 
causation is anti-symmetric.  (A relation R is symmetric 
just in case, for arbitrary a and b, Rab if and only if 
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Rba.  A relation R is anti-symmetric just in case Rab if 
and only if it is not the case that Rba.)  For example, 
suppose that something is loved by all the gods if and only 
if it is pious.  Obviously, then, from the symmetry of 
biconditionality, it is also pious if and only if it is so 
loved.  In contrast, to take Socrates’ example from the 
Euthyphro (10a-11a), if being pious is the cause of being 
loved by all the gods, then being so loved is not the cause 
of being pious. 
 3. OVERVIEW OF ARGUMENT 
 Desire is not a symmetric relation:  A can desire B 
without B desiring A.  But belonging together is 
symmetrical:  if A belongs with B, certainly B belongs with 
A.  There are two stages to the argument.  First, from the 
hypothesis that desire is the cause of friendship, Socrates 
argues that, whenever there is desire and hence love and 
friendship, the cause of the desire is the symmetric 
relation of belonging together.  Then, from the symmetry of 
belonging, he infers that if A loves B, B will befriend A.  
The details are as follows. 
4. FROM NON-SYMMETRIC DESIRE TO SYMMETRIC BELONGING 
1 Desire causes friendship 221d2-4). 
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The language Socrates uses to introduce this premise 
(“can it really be?”) and of Menexenus’s reply (“There’s a 
good chance,”) tells us that this premise is stated as a 
hypothesis to test, not as an obvious truth. 
 
2 Lack causes desire (221d6-e1). 
Premise 2, in contrast to premise 1, is not stated as 
a hypothesis, but as a statement which Socrates and 
Menexenus see to be true.  It should be unobjectionable to 
us, too.  In the Protagoras, after that sophist’s great 
speech, Socrates says of it that he is “lacking only a 
small thing to have got it all” (329b6).  Evidently, 
according to Socrates’ use of “lacking” there, the thing 
lacking need not formerly have been possessed. Just as you 
can desire something you never possessed, so too you can 
lack something you never had. We use this sense of 
“lacking” in English: we can speak for instance of a man 
lacking knowledge, even if he never possessed the 
knowledge.6 
 
3 Therefore lack causes friendship (221e1-2). 
This inference follows from the transitivity of 
causation. (A relation R is transitive just in case, for 




4 Deprivation causes lack (221e2-3). 
This text is offered by Socrates without hesitation 
and is accepted as undeniable by Menexenus. Thus we should 
find an interpretation of “deprived” (221e3) that explains 
the ready acceptance.7  In an earlier passage Socrates and 
the boys agree that the presence of the bad can “deprive” 
(217e8) that which is intermediate of its desire for the 
good. As Socrates there (217e6-218a1) illustrates, 
ignorance, when we recognize it (which means that we are 
intermediate) makes us desire wisdom, but ignorance can 
deprive us of the very desire to become wise (when we cease 
to be intermediate and become bad). Bad ignorant people (as 
opposed to intermediate ignorant people) have no desire for 
wisdom, because ignorance has deprived them of that desire. 
It is not necessary that bad people at some earlier time 
were neither good nor bad, desired wisdom, and then lost 
the desire at some point. That sort of life is possible, 
but the dramatic evidence of Socrates with the youth in the 
Lysis itself (see also Ap. 21a-23c for Socrates’ experience 
with the variety of humanity) suggests that it is more 
natural for youths never to have suspected the depths of 
their own ignorance (hence to be bad) until they are 
wakened to a sense of wonder by Socrates and become 
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desirous of gaining wisdom (whence they become 
intermediate). In terms of Socrates’ example, when x “has 
ignorance in such a way as to be bad” (218a4-5), then the 
ignorance deprives x of desire for wisdom. In this example, 
something (the presence, in a particular way, of ignorance) 
causes or explains why something else (that which is 
neither good nor bad) is lacking a third thing (its desire 
for good). Let us generalize this point in a definition: “C 
deprives A of B” means C is the cause of A lacking B.8 So 
the point of “A has been deprived of B” is not “A had B, 
and then lost it” but rather “there is some cause 
explaining why A does not have (and perhaps never had) B.” 
On this reading, premise 4 will be undeniable:  lacking-
for-cause causes lacking.  
 
5 Therefore belonging causes friendship (221e3-5). 
The inference to premise 5 is the decisive step in the 
argument, since lack and deprivation are non-symmetric 
relations, while belonging-together is symmetric.  
Premise 5 follows from premises 3, 4, and the unstated 
premise that belonging causes lack. To illustrate this 
unstated premise, consider the following contrasting facts 




(i) My chess set came lacking a piece (say, the white 
queen). 
(ii) My chess set did not come with any alien pieces from 
other games (such as the queen of hearts from a deck 
of cards). 
 
The reason why, in the absence of both the white queen and 
the queen of hearts, my chess set lacks only the white 
queen is because the white queen belongs with my chess set 
but the queen of hearts does not.9 The argument is tracing 
causation in the background condition of lack and desire, 
as stated at premise 1:  “whenever something does desire” 
(221d4).  We ought to understand a similar condition 
implicit at premise 5:  Whenever someone loves, the love is 
of what belongs.  On my interpretation, then, premise 5 is 
consistent with the fact that things can belong to me that 
I do not love; this is the case when they are in my 
possession. 
 
6 Therefore friends belong with each other (221e5-7). 
This premise or aside merely makes explicit the 
symmetric nature of the relation belonging-together, 
developed in premise 5.  In terms of my illustration there, 
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my chess set belongs with a white queen just in case, 
obviously, that white queen belongs with my chess set.   
5. FROM SYMMETRIC BELONGING TO REQUITAL 
7 Therefore the lover belongs with his beloved (221e7-
222a4). 
Only Menexenus agrees to premise 7; Lysis is “silent” 
(222a4).  I agree with many interpreters (e.g. Bolotin 
1979: 185, Gonzalez 1995: 84-85, pace Rowe 2000: 212) that 
Lysis is here anticipating Socrates’ argument for love 
being requited, which, given premise 5 and the symmetry of 
belonging-together, is now plain: 
 
(i) Suppose, for arbitrary A and B, that A loves B. 
(ii) It follows [from (i) and premise 5] that B 
belongs with A.  
(iii) It follows [from (ii) and the symmetry of 
belonging together illustrated in premise 6] that A 
belongs with B. 
(iv) It follows [from (iii) and premise 5] that B 
loves A. Q.E.D. 
 
8 But belonging causes friendship (222a4-6). 
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Premise 5 says that “love turns out to be of the 
oikeion” (221e3-4). Premise 8 says that it is “necessary 
for us to love the oikeion” (222a5-6).  On my causal 
interpretation of the argument, both premises are saying 
that the oikeion, namely, the relation of belonging 
together, causes love and friendship (in the background 
condition of non-presence).  Thus premise 8 simply restates 
premise 5.  Socrates shows he is aware he is making this 
restatement by his use of the perfect tense to say premise 
8 “was made evident”, a reference back to his use of the 
same verb in the present tense—“it is evident”—to describe 
his inference to premise 5.10  
 Why is Socrates restating this premise?  Lysis did not 
assent to premise 7, foreseeing the undesirable conclusion 
that boys must receive their pederasts.  So Socrates 
restates the crucial premise 5 to Lysis, reminding him of 
its agreed necessity.11   
 
9 Therefore, true love is requited ( 222a6-222b1). 
Given premise 5 (= premise 8) and the symmetry of 
belonging together illustrated in premise 6, the conclusion 
is undeniable, as shown by the argument 7(i)-(iv) above. 
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6. THE MAIN OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED 
An equivocation on oikeios?  One main objection is 
that Socrates’ argument equivocates.  According to this 
objection, premise 5 and the unstated premise that 
belonging causes lack are true only in a non-symmetric 
sense of oikeion as belonging-to, while premise 6, that 
friends belong together, requires a different, symmetric 
sense of oikeion as belonging-together.12 
As shown above, I interpret the oikeion relation 
everywhere it occurs in the argument as symmetric belonging 
together, never as non-symmetric belonging-to. So I have 
defeated the equivocation objection.  But my reply raises 
another objection, which I state as follows.  
Will the good reciprocate? In his first conversation 
with Lysis (207d-210d) Socrates developed a non-symmetric 
sense of oikeion as belonging-to.  On the basis of seven 
examples, ranging from mule-carting to weaving to household 
and civic management, Socrates established that if you are 
wise in any matter, others “will entrust” their affairs in 
that matter to you (210b1) and will be friends to you and 
belong to you in those matters (210d1-2, quoted above, sec. 
1).  They will belong to you, in other words, as a 
dependent belongs to a guardian in whatever matter they 
depend upon your wisdom.  This dependency/guardian model of 
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belonging and friendship is consistent with the lengthy 
account of friendship as a relation between the 
intermediate and the good (216d-220b), though belonging is 
not mentioned in that account. 
Now the problem with conceiving the relation of 
belonging together as the relation between dependent and 
guardian is not caused by the fact that dependency and 
guardianship are anti-symmetric: I am your dependent 
(guardian) if and only if you are not my dependent 
(guardian).  Such an anti-symmetry of belonging to does not 
affect the symmetry of belonging together, since dependency 
and guardianship are reciprocal.  (Two relations R1 and R2 
are reciprocal just in case R1ab if and only if R2ba.)  And 
exactly this reciprocity exists between guardians and 
dependents:  I am your dependent if and only if you are my 
guardian.   
The problem, rather, with conceiving the relation of 
belonging together as dependency/guardianship is that it 
appears to provide for friendship only in one direction. 
Let us grant that the dependent loves his guardian:  the 
dependent is imperfect, and the guardian completes his 
lack.  But why must the guardian reciprocate the love of 
the dependent?  After all, qua guardian, she has no 
imperfections and no lacks. 
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I find this objection in Robinson:  
 
The suggestion Plato sets out at the greatest 
length about what might be [lovable] is the theory 
that the good will be [lovable] to the 
intermediate. . . .  Perhaps . . . this could be 
applied to men, so that an intermediate man would be 
attracted to a good man.  But Aristotle would have 
asked:  very well, and how is the good man attracted 
to the intermediate man?  To which Plato would have no 
answer, since on the one hand only goodness is 
attractive, and on the other the man who is already 
good is self-sufficient.  Plato has not . . . made any 
provision which would allow this one-way attraction to 
become an element in a mutual friendship (1986: 79).13 
 
 But Plato certainly has made provision, if we allow 
ourselves to look at book 1 of the Republic, where Socrates 
elicits a functional thesis about the good from 
Polemarchus: 
 
-- It is not, I take it, the function of heat to chill 




-- Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite. 
-- Assuredly. 
-- Nor yet of the good to harm but of its opposite 
(335d). 
 
We ought to grant Socrates that, just as it is the function 
of the bad to harm, so also it is the function of the good 
to benefit.  But then Socrates can ask us:  “Suppose that 
you are intermediate and love a good. Will not your love be 
requited if you receive favors and benefits from your 
darling?”  We ought to admit this, too.14 
 It seems to me that this argument from the function of 
goodness can only be escaped, if at all, by taking an 
extreme, Thrasymachean, attitude to goodness, that is, by 
denying that good people insofar as they are good need have 
any care for bad and intermediate people.  Thus, to test 
Socrates’ reply, let us now make precisely this objection.  
“Socrates,” we shall say, “You are so far wrong about the 
nature of the truly good that you do not know that 
guardians care for their dependents only as sheep to be 
fleeced” (see Rep. 343b-c):  “Consider this type of good 
man, then!” (344a1). 
 As it happens, Socrates refutes even this extreme 




(S1) “Strictly speaking” (341c4-5) and “correctly” 
speaking (341c9), the good man or guardian or ruler 
“is so-called because of his expertise” (341d2-3). 
(S2)“Expertise does not seek its own good but the good 
of its object” (342c4-6). 
 
The conclusion is inescapable: 
 
(S3) The good man, speaking precisely and correctly, 
does not seek his own good but the good of the object 
of his expertise. 
 
Socrates’ argument S1-S3 confirms his thesis with 
Polemarchus that the good is functionally beneficent.   
 We find this same requiting beneficence of the good 
explicit in the Lysis itself, as an explanation why, when 
you become wise, “all will be dependent upon and belong 
with you: because you will be useful to all” (210d2-3).   
We also find this requiting beneficence implicit at 
the end of the Lysis, immediately following the present 
argument. There Socrates states the doctrine that the good 




Shall we assert either (a) that the good belongs with 
everything and the bad is alien to everything, or (b) 
that bad belongs with bad, good with good, and 
intermediate with intermediate? (222c3-7) 
 
It is significant that there are far more than the two 
possibilities Socrates mentions.15  An interpretation of the 
Lysis ought to tell us why Socrates mentions just these 
two, and then immediately eliminates disjunct (b) as 
untenable (222d1-5).  On my reading, Socrates mentions only 
one alternative to disjunct (b) because he wants to dangle 
before his audience, as Plato dangles before his reader, 
disjunct (a).  As, for example, Fraisse 1974: 144 notes, 
that the good belongs with everything is “the true 
conclusion of the Lysis.”  Disjunct (a) is the key to 
understanding both the ultimate aporia of the dialogue and 
the penultimate paradox that true love is requited.16 
My defense of Socrates’ argument that true love is 
requited adds a premise about the beneficence of the good, 
a premise that is mentioned, although not defended in the 
Lysis itself.  This premise completes the Socratic account 
of love and friendship.  According to Socrates’ “divinely 
inspired” (216d3) account, in any friendship one party is 
good, the other intermediate.  These two belong with each 
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other as guardian and dependent.  The intermediate lacks 
and hence desires and loves the good as a dependent needily 
loves its guardian.  Because of and in requital of this 
need, the good cares for and benefits the intermediate just 
as a guardian loves its dependent.  The Lysis spends most 
of its time elaborating the structure of dependent-love.  
Guardian-love, that is, the requiting beneficence of the 
good is mentioned twice, as shown above. Moreover, the 
model of guardian-love, aiming at the happiness of its 
dependent, is taken for granted at 207d: “Lysis, I suppose 
your parents love you.”  “Of course they do.”  “And so they 
would want you to be as happy as possible?” “Certainly.”  
A contradiction in the guardian/dependent model?  On my 
view, lover A is needy and desirous, while beloved B is 
good, needing nothing.  As Socrates has argued, since A 
loves B, A and B belong together and B therefore is a 
friend to A.  But, one might object, it must follow from 
B’s friendship for A that therefore B desires A and 
therefore B lacks A.  But B’s lacking A or anything else is 
inconsistent with B’s goodness.17 
 To reply, the inconsistency arises when we infer from 
B’s friendship for A that B must desire A.  The objection 




(1) Desire is the cause of friendship (a necessary and 
sufficient cause). 
 
But premise 1 as stated does not license us to say that B’s 
friendship for A entails that B desires A.  To get this 
license, we would need to interpret premise 1 as: 
 
(1both)  The cause of friendship between A and B is desire 
on both sides, by both A and B. 
 
Given 1both, B’s being a friend to A entails that B desires 
A, leading to inconsistency.  But there is no need to 
interpret premise 1 as 1both.  For there is a superior 
alternative:  
 
(1one) The cause of friendship between A and B is desire 
on one side, by either A or B. 
 
According to interpretation 1one, premise 1 is parallel to 
the preceding, rejected hypothesis that the bad is the 
cause of friendship, a hypothesis developed and then 
rejected at 216d-221c.  There is no doubt that, according 
to that prior account, the statement the bad is the cause 
of friendship would mean only that one side suffers from 
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badness:  the other side of such a friendship is explicitly 
described as good.  Thus for example “the body (which is 
neither good nor bad) because of illness (a bad thing), is 
a friend to medical expertise (a good thing); and the 
medical expertise takes upon itself the friendship for the 
sake of health (a good thing)” (219a).  Interpretation 1one 
allows us to provide a strictly parallel account, caused by 
desire instead of the bad, as follows.  Suppose that A 
needily loves B because of desire, and is in that way a 
friend to B, it does follow that A and B belong together 
and that B requites this love by being a friend to A.  But 
it does not follow that B loves A with needy desire.  B 
may, consistently with 1one, be a friend to A without 
desire, lack, or deprivation, just as in the preceding 
model (taken from 219a) medical expertise befriended sick 
bodies without itself needing to suffer anything bad.  
According to the desire model I propose, B’s beneficence to 
A is one part of the friendship between A and B (A’s 
neediness for B is the other part of it).  And that 
friendship is caused by desire, just as S1 states, but not 
by both A and B’s desire, only by A’s desire.  In this way 
there is no inconsistency. 
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7. SOCRATIC METHOD 
One problem remains: the nature of guardian-love, 
while defended in the Republic, is not elaborated in the 
Lysis itself.  This raises a question about Plato’s and 
Socrates’ method. Let me assume that I have succeeded in 
giving Socrates a sound argument and in showing how his 
conclusion is true, however paradoxical it may seem. I turn 
now to the question whether it is plausible to interpret 
Socrates the character and Plato the author as intending to 
set this puzzle and solution for the audience and reader.  
What Robinson says about another interpretation applies to 
my reading as well: “If Plato was . . . leaving it to the 
reader to follow the thread of the dialogue without further 
signposting, it must be said that he constructed a highly 
teasing maze for the purpose of this exercise” (1986: 80-
81). 
To reply to this interpretive (rather than 
philosophical) objection let me state two assumptions of my 
method.  First, I assume that the intellectualist Socrates 
portrayed in a number of Platonic dialogues has a coherent 
overall position.  As Irwin puts it, “Socrates claims that 
his different arguments and inquiries support the same 
conclusions” (1995:  31, citing Cr. 46b3-c6, 49a4-b6; also 
G. 482a5-c3, 509a4-7).  I take this assumption to justify 
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my importing arguments from book 1 of the Republic in order 
to defend an argument in the Lysis.  We ought not expect 
any single philosophical conversation to consider every 
possible objection, and we should be satisfied if the 
objection is answered in another conversation by the same 
character.   
Second, I assume that the aporia we find explicitly at 
the end of many Socratic dialogues, including the Lysis, 
and implicitly in paradoxical conclusions reached within 
dialogues, such as the conclusion of the present argument 
that true love is requited, has a pedagogical motivation.  
If the Lysis were a conventional expository treatise, we 
ought indeed to judge it a failure if its readers were 
unable to identify the conclusion for which it argues. But 
my assumption is that Plato’s aporetic dialogue style is 
not a primitive forerunner to the style of the 
philosophical treatise, but a sophisticated alternative.  
My assumption is that he wants to avoid giving his readers 
a make-believe understanding, the pretence of wisdom, even 
more than he wants to persuade them to affirm some 
particular conclusion of his.  The author Plato, I assume, 
shares the values of the character Socrates, who thinks any 
such theoretical results as might be reached in a 
conventional exposition of the conclusions of the Lysis 
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are, like the rest of Socrates’ insights, nothing to speak 
of (Ap. 23a-b), a Socrates who says it is better not to 
possess such meager wisdom if the risk is to lose 
consciousness of one’s own ignorance about what really 
matters (Ap. 22d-e; see Rudebusch 1999:  9-17 for further 
discussion of this aporetic pedagogy).  I take this second 
assumption to answer the charge that my reading would force 
us to condemn Plato’s dialogue as a failure to communicate.  
On the contrary, my method throughout this paper assumes 
that Alcibiades’ characterization of Socratic argument is 
accurate:  upon examination, their laughable superficial 
appearance proves to contain an argument of godlike truth 
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1  The perceived low quality of the argument led some 
interpreters to deny that the Lysis is authentically 
Plato’s (Ast 1816, Socher 1820) and others to place it 
early in Plato’s career, before his reasoning skills had 
developed (Hermann 1839).  Glidden (1981: 39) lists other 
negative appraisals of the Lysis.  Versenyi (1975: 185) is 
probably correct in his explanation of the relative neglect 
of the Lysis in the early and middle twentieth century on 
the grounds of a “negative appraisal of its substantive 
content.” He himself entirely neglects—for the same reason, 
I presume—any discussion of the particular argument that 
true love is requited.  Rowe (2000: 211) describes this 
particular argument as “not only poor but appalling.” 
2  Bordt (1998: 108-119) gives excellent information 
about the dramatic and cultural context.  See also Dover 
(1978) on ancient Greek pedophilia. 
3  Where the English translation differs from Lombardo’s, 
whom I have followed, it is my own.  
4   These two arguments might appear at odds in 
identifying the cause of friendship.  According to the 
first argument, the cause is wisdom.  According to the 
second, it is desire.  In fact these causes are 
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complementary in the same way that fuel, oxygen, and heat 
are complementary causes of fire:  each could be named as 
the cause against a background of the other. 
5  This may be the view of Reshotko 1997: 12, who speaks 
of a “direct equation” in this argument. 
6  One might reasonably add that lack causes desire only 
with the background condition that there is perception of 
lack (as at Phb. 43b-c).  On Socrates’ reliance upon 
background conditions in developing his causal account, see 
note 4 above. 
7  I thank Christopher Rowe for getting me, in 
correspondence, to worry about premise 4 (see Rowe 2000: 
213 n. 31 for a record of his helping hand to me). Rowe 
(2000: 212), apparently from misplaced charity to the 
argument, mistranslates the Greek text of premise 4 as 
“whatever has something taken away from it comes to be 
lacking,” commenting that “the best that can be said for 
this” is his interpretation:  “If something (some part) is 
taken away from x, x will be lacking (that part).” 
 Before Rowe, Bordt (1998: 222) likewise made 
deprivation a sufficient but not necessary condition of 
lack: “Someone has a lack of something, if it has been 
taken away from him” (Man hat an etwas dann einen Mangel, 
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wenn es einem entzogen worden ist). But on p. 223 he 
indifferently stated premise 4 as making lack a sufficient 
but not necessary condition of deprivation: “Someone only 
has a lack of something if it has been taken from him” (man 
nur dann an etwas einen Mangel hat, wenn es einem entrissen 
worden ist). Bordt refers to Aristophanes’ myth (Symp. 
189d-193b) to give a “certain plausibility” to premise 4 on 
the basis of its felt existential appeal (1998: 223). But 
as Socrates rejects Aristophanes’ account of desire in the 
Symposium, it seems unreasonable that he would tacitly rely 
upon it in the Lysis. 
8  This interpretation is consistent with the use of 
“deprive” at Rep. 360e4 and 367b5. 
9  Following Rep. 1 (352e-353b), we might explain 
belonging together, in its turn, in terms of performing a 
function.  The white queen and the rest of the chess set 
have a function they perform together; the queen of hearts 
and the chess set do not. I thank Howard Curzer for 
pointing this out to me.  
10  No interpreter to my knowledge has noticed that 
premise 8 is and is intended as a restatement of premise 5. 
Bordt (1998: 223) takes premise 8, in his terms, “(c),” as 
a “distinct consequence.” 
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11  No interpreter to my knowledge has indicated that 
premise 8 is addressed to Lysis. Bolotin (1979: 185) claims 
without support that Menexenus, not Lysis, assents to it. 
But to Lysis is implied by the Greek grammar:  the 
immediate antecedent of “he said” (222a6)is “Lysis” at 
222a4; hence premise 8 is addressed to Lysis.  This 
grammatical construction makes sense if we recognize that 
premise 8 restates premise 5, as shown above. 
12  Bolotin, who defends the argument, does not consider 
this objection.  Robinson raises this objection as a 
criticism of the argument.  Bordt and Rowe say the 
equivocation is intentional and done for artistic reasons.  
Mackenzie and Gonzalez describe the inference as 
“suggestion” only, though in a later work Gonzalez defends 
the inference. 
Bolotin (1979: 186) defends the structure of the 
argument:  “Socrates’ conclusion . . . follows directly 
from the understanding of love as love of one’s kindred, 
since kinship, as distinct from mere ownership, is by its 
nature reciprocal.  One cannot be akin to another without 
the other being akin to oneself.  Accordingly, a genuine 
love of one’s natural kin is of necessity returned.”  
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Unfortunately he does not consider objections such as 
equivocation. 
Robinson (1986: 76) states the equivocation:  “The 
sense of oikeios in which a possession which has been taken 
away from one is oikeion = “one’s own” is not normally a 
symmetrical sense:  my possessions belong to me but I do 
not belong to them.”  At the Archelogos website: “Lysis 
Overall Interpretation” he writes (in 2002):  “The Greek 
term oikeion which stands for ‘appropriate’ and ‘akin’ 
. . . has its own ambiguities; not all that is 
‘appropriate’ to me is such that I am reciprocally 
‘appropriate’ to it; so to infer ‘kinship’ of some kind 
from ‘appropriateness’ of one or other kind is a dangerous 
move.” 
Bordt (1998) perceives an equivocation (eine 
Schwierigkeit in der argumentation) between non-symmetric 
(einseitigen) and symmetric (gegenseitigen) relations (p. 
225).  On his reading, Plato intentionally constructs the 
fallacy but means to make us aware (macht uns . . . 
aufmerksam) of the need  for such a distinction by leading 
the discussion into perplexity (p. 226). 
Like Bordt, Rowe (2000: 212 with n. 29) thinks the 
fallacy is too obvious to be intentional:  “There are no 
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grounds for Socrates’ implicit claim that . . . it is what 
is akin that is philon. [Fn. 29 continues:  The text] 
suggests that philia must therefore involve a reciprocal 
relationship, but presumably only for humorous purposes:  
so Hippothales, being a genuine lover of Lysis, must be the 
object of his philia.”  
Although Mackenzie (1988: 30) does not call it 
fallacious, she describes what is certainly an inference in 
the text as merely a “suggestion”:  “The desire will thus 
be of what properly belongs to the desirer. . . .  And 
that, in turn, gives us a further suggestion, that the 
friendship relation exists between two who are naturally 
akin (221e6).”  
Like Mackenzie, Gonzalez (1995: 84) calls the 
inference a “suggestion” and “explanation” but not an 
inference:  “Does the identification of to philon with to 
oikeion allow love to be in any way reciprocal?  This is 
clearly suggested by Socrates when, immediately after 
making the identification, he turns to Lysis and Menexenus 
and explains that they are friends because they are by 
nature oikeioi (221e5-6).”  However, Gonzalez (1998: 14) 
does identify premise 6 as an inference from premise 5: 
“Immediately after defining the object of love as to 
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oikeion he infers that if Lysis and Menexenus are philoi to 
one another they must also be oikeioi to each other (221e5-
6).” See next note for discussion of Gonzalez’s defense of 
the inference. 
13  Also: “There is very possibly also a rapid suggestion, 
not formally refuted, that the good is oikeion to the 
intermediate.  But if Plato took this seriously, he would 
have been left with the continuing problem about 
reciprocity if he wished to apply this sense of oikeiotēs 
to the explanation of friendship” (Robinson 1986: 76 n. 
23).  
 Gonzalez (1998: 14) endorses the following solution to 
this problem, a solution he attributes to Ziebis (1927: 26-
7) and which I also find in Fraisse (1974: 145): “the Good 
engenders relations of oikeiotès among all of which it is 
the end” (see also p. 148).  “(i) The fact that the good by 
nature belongs to all of us is what enables us to belong by 
nature to each other.  In other words, (ii) our shared 
kinship with the good provides the basis for our kinship 
with one another. . . .  A good example of such kinship is 
Socrates’ relationship with the boys in the present 
dialogue, a relationship constituted by the mutual pursuit 
of wisdom.”  There are three problems with his solution.  
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1. His inference by restatement from statement (i) to 
statement (ii) seems to equivocate between a non-
symmetric relation, belonging-to, and a symmetric 
relation, kinship-with.   
2. Socrates nowhere argues that two intermediate objects 
ever become friends with each other.  On the contrary, 
the present discussion is still working under the 
model of friendship that Socrates “like a mantic” 
divined (216d3), namely, that “what is neither good 
nor bad loves what is beautiful i.e. good” (216d3-4).  
The discussion has not abandoned that model, but is 
seeking to elaborate it by identifying the cause of 
the love of the intermediate for the good.  Socrates 
has ruled out badness as this cause (221b-c).  This 
has led him, in the present argument, to postulate 
that desire is the cause of friendship, while the lack 
of what belongs is the cause of desire.  Not only 
would it be illogical for him to adopt a different 
model without notifying his audience, he evidently has 
argued against the model that intermediate can be 
friend to intermediate on the grounds that like is not 
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friend to like (214c), a point he reiterates at the 
end of this argument (222b6-8). 
3. Even if we admit the dubious proposition that the fact 
that two intermediate objects are oikeion to the good 
causes the two intermediate objects to become oikeion 
and friends to each other, we have not answered the 
problem at issue here:  why would the good love the 
intermediate? 
 
14  Objection:  A’s love for B is not requited if B merely 
benefits A by providing A with goods.  If B is to requite 
A’s love, B must love A back with emotion and need. 
 Reply:  This objection’s conception of love as 
requiring emotional need is too narrow.  It is at odds, for 
instance, with the standard theological claim that a 
perfect God may love humanity.  I thank Roslyn Weiss for 
leading me to consider this objection. 
 A similar objection is raised by Fraisse (1974: 130).  
For Fraisse, true requital requires not needy emotion but a 
Kantian good will: “In no part of this first discussion [at 
Lys. 209] does Plato indicate that the sage may be himself 
philos [i.e. a lover; Socrates takes pains to emphasize he 
will be beloved].  He is wise, he is useful, he is good, 
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but his good deeds are not the result of any particular 
good will:  [the sage] will be content to act as a 
consequence of his expertise [not as a consequence of his 
good will].”  Surely this is another excessively narrow 
conception of love. 
15  There are in fact 256 possibilities, if we include 
reflexive, non-symmetrical, and non-transitive relations.  
I thank Janet McShane for demonstrating 256 to me. 
16   Haden (1983; 355) finds four forms of friendship in 
the Lysis, the third being “between one who has achieved 
the Good and one who has not.  Here the former in virtue of 
his very fulfillment and self-sufficiency freely uses the 
power flowing from his completeness to help the other; the 
good (person) really is the friend of the bad and the 
friend the friend of the enemy in this case.”  On my 
interpretation, it is false that the good is friend to the 
bad.  The good belongs with the bad, to be sure (it belongs 
with everything!), but the bad does not desire the good 
(see 217e, discussed above in section 4, at premise 4).  
When the bad, under the influence of Socratic examination, 
comes to desire wisdom (the good), then bad is transformed 
into intermediate.  It is at precisely that moment that 
friendship begins between good and what is now no longer 
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bad but intermediate, a friendship caused by the desire of 
the intermediate, a desiring love requited by the good. 
17  I thank Sara Rappe for leading me to consider this 
objection. 
